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 While music is a consistently present and important part of most people’s lives in some 
way or another, it seems its importance is often overlooked when we consider the composition 
and meaning of our existence.1  Yet discussions of music can be found at the center of the major 
works of political philosophers, including Plato, Aristotle, and Friedrich Nietzsche.  In the 
writing of these three authors, music plays an important, even central, role in how we connect 
with the experiences of others and evaluate our own existence.  As a result, I believe a discussion 
of this role is important to the larger social and political discourse.  For each of these authors, 
music has the ability to alter, for better and worse, our relationship to the world around us and 
our interaction with others.  
 For all three authors, this debate centers on a discussion of Greek tragic drama.  The 
power of Greek drama is difficult to segregate from its musical elements, particularly the chorus.  
Although tragic drama combines visual and poetic elements with the musical, the powerful 
influence of its content rests largely on the effects created by the music.  For Plato, discussions of 
music’s potential and the role of tragic drama take place most notably in the Republic.  In their 
exploration of the ideal city, Socrates, and Plato’s brothers, Adeimantus and Glaucon, discuss the 
value of tragic drama as well as the role of music in the education of the city’s guardians.  Music 
has the potential for edification, but because of its emotional power, its place is prescribed and 
monitored.  Aristotle addresses the place of tragedy in the Poetics, arguing that tragic drama has 
the ability to educate us.  The staging of tragedy offers the audience a vicarious personal 
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experience.  For Aristotle, tragedy creates an understanding of the experience of others, promotes 
unity, and leads to better politics.  Political deliberation, for Aristotle, requires a plurality of 
perspectives and an appreciation for the experiences of others.  In the Politics, this deliberation is 
compared to a musical performance in which multiple parts work together to produce a larger 
good, rather than the unitary approach to government presented in the Republic.  For Nietzsche, 
too, music provides greater benefit than harm.  Nietzsche’s reference to works by Richard 
Wagner at the close of The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music, including Tristan und 
Isolde and Lohengrin, as renaissance examples of tragic drama lends support to the idea of music 
as the crux of tragedy’s power.  “In return, music imparts to the tragic myth an intense and 
convincing metaphysical significance that word and image without this single help could never 
have attained.” (Nietzsche 2000a, 126)  By presenting human flaws as awe-inspiring, tragedy 
gives us the courage to live our lives irrespective of them.  Nietzsche emphasizes our ability to 
accept human shortcomings once seeing them aggrandized through tragic drama, the foundation 
of which is music.  
 More broadly, the presentation of human flaws with a kind of awesome power empowers 
us to reject nihilism, a view of existence partially explored, or at least alluded to in the writing of 
two of the three authors.  In Plato’s Republic, the alternative to justice found in the ideal city that 
Socrates describes is a state of nihilism, embodied in tyranny, a life filled driven by selfish 
acquisition.  The reality of this empty existence, tied so painfully to immediate and venal desires, 
is ultimately meaninglessness in Plato’s view.  Socrates fears such a state of humanity and 
refuses the idea that a life in which each man cares for and pursues only his own success and 
desires is best.  Socrates is motivated to explore the intrinsic value of justice by the possibility 
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that he might prove a life of integrity to be better than the life of a tyrant.  Nietzsche more 
outrightly defines his fear of nihilism and argues the strength to overcome such a view can be 
found in the experience of music and tragic drama. 
 The most basic form of political interaction is the co-existence of many individuals.  Our 
ability to live with others in a community requires an interaction with our neighbors that is 
necessarily political.  Successful co-existence depends on our ability to negotiate disagreements, 
set up successful systems of trade, and defend our common space from danger.  After examining 
the writing of Nietzsche, Plato, and Aristotle, I find that Nietzsche, seemingly the least political 
of all three, offers the most politically promising explanation of human life.  In this thesis, I will 
argue that Nietzsche’s view of tragedy as a prevention of nihilism through its potential for self-
forgetting is the most important political tool discussed by all three authors, and allows him to 
navigate the dialectic between philosophy and politics found in Plato and Aristotle.  While 
Nietzsche is the least political, and perhaps the least generous to ideas of democracy, the 
individual lifestyle he describes and advocates for is unintentionally the one best suited to co-
existence with others.  Music, for which he is a champion, has the ability to help us recognize 
and experience a human oneness, provides inspiration to live with our own outstanding flaws 
when employed in tragic drama, and can lead to successful interaction with others.  While 
Nietzsche does not and would not describe his understanding of music as a service to political 
ends, the value he assigns it is necessary for the political usefulness that both Plato and Aristotle 
find in music and tragedy, and is most useful for existence as a political being in society. 
1. Nihilism
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 The purpose of Plato’s Republic is the investigation of justice’s intrinsic value.  By 
proving that justice is valuable in itself, Socrates can demonstrate that a tyrannical, unjust life is 
not most desirable.  Instead, a fulfilling life is one lived in service to something greater than 
momentary, selfish desires.  This series of proofs gives human existence meaning.  The work 
opens with Socrates’s questioning of Cephalus, an old man, regarding his definition of justice.  
Cephalus defines justice as “speaking the truth and repaying what one has borrowed.”  As 
Socrates’s inquiry continues, the definition is amended by Polemarchus, Cephalus’s son, to 
giving both friends and enemies what they are owed, “that to benefit one’s friends and harm 
one’s enemies is justice.”  Thrasymachus, a third party, becomes irritated with Socrates’s 
questioning and offers an alternative and unsettling definition of justice.  “This, then, is what I 
say justice is, the same in all cities, the advantage of the established rule.  Since the established 
rule is surely stronger, anyone who reasons correctly will conclude that the just is the same 
everywhere, namely, the advantage of the stronger.”  Thrasymachus adds, “So, Socrates, 
injustice, if it is on a large enough scale, is stronger, freer, and more masterly than justice.  And, 
as I said from the first, justice is what is advantageous to the stronger, while injustice is to one’s 
own profit and advantage.”  The question of whether justice is something that can be valued in 
and of itself, without external benefits becomes the core of the discussion.  Socrates, unwilling to 
be convinced by Thrasymachus’s argument, sets out to show the intrinsic value of being just.  
Socrates believes justice is an intrinsic good and knowledge of this good creates the best life.  He 
is persuaded to explore the value of justice because his ultimate desire is to prove knowledge 
leads to a better life than tyranny.  The assumed preference for a tyrannical life, which is 
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portrayed by the story of the Ring of Gyges2 in Book II of the Republic, troubles Socrates.  He 
believes a void will remain if and when the tyrant’s every desire has been fulfilled and all his 
immediate needs met because he will continue to lack anything of substance.  Instead, he will 
live a life without meaning and purpose.  The fear of nihilism expressed in the Republic is that if 
tyranny is the best life, one that ultimately produces no fulfillment and achieves no purpose, then 
human existence is meaningless.  If the discovery of truth and consequent fulfillment is simply a 
matter of taking time to think considerately about our existence, Plato and Socrates believe there 
is a pressing incentive to help people do so. (Plato 1992, 9, 15, 20)
 The means Socrates selects for the investigation of justice’s intrinsic value in the 
Republic is the analogy of the soul to a city.  Once he is able to identify a proper definition of 
justice on a large scale, he says he will be able to identify justice within the individual and 
determine whether it has intrinsic benefits.  This claim produces some problems for political 
interaction, something that must happen between individuals.  The kind of interaction that occurs 
between separate individuals is not easily reproduced within a single person.  Despite the fact 
that Socrates uses the model of a political structure, the city, to conduct his investigation of 
justice’s intrinsic value, the ways in which politics could contribute to our search for meaning 
and the prevention of nihilism take a back seat to the individual’s means of attaining fulfillment.  
The city of the Republic as a metaphor for the soul allows Socrates to address concerns related to 
the individual and their sense of purpose and meaning, but interactions between members of the 
city cannot be considered.  Productive interactions between individuals in a real city cannot be 
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2 The ring of Gyges has the power to render its wearer invisible.  Glaucon argues that any person in possession of 
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and our only reason for acting justly is out of fear of the consequences imposed by society. (Plato 1992, 36)
replicated in a psychologically sound way within the soul of a single person.  Ultimately the only 
facet of the Republic that makes it a work of political philosophy is this metaphor, but it is this 
very metaphor that prevents the consideration of political interaction as a means of avoiding 
nihilism.
 A nihilist view of existence can be found in other works of Plato, the Apology and the 
Phaedo among them.  In the Apology, Socrates describes death as one of two things: either a 
kind of positive journey out of this life and into another where we are united with those who 
have passed, or it is nothing “and [we] have no awareness whatsoever of anything at all.”  
Becoming reunited with those who have passed allows for continued inquiry in pursuit of truth.  
At the close of the Apology, Socrates says, “But now it’s time to leave, I to die and you to live.  
Which of us goes to the better thing, however, is unclear to everyone except the god.”  (Plato 
2002a, 58, 61) We can assume that Socrates believes death might be preferable to life if it offers 
the potential of greater interrogation in pursuit of truth.  The Phaedo, the Platonic dialogue in 
which friends visit Socrates in prison and help him prepare for his execution, also depicts 
Socrates as calm, even relieved at death’s approach.  After being encouraged to prolong the 
execution as much as possible and spend his last moments taking advantage of final pleasures, 
Socrates says “And it’s reasonable too for me not to do them, since I think I’ll gain nothing by 
drinking the poison a little later.”  Socrates’s attitude towards the end of his life, despite the 
pursuit of knowledge it has afforded him, is one of acceptance.  At the end of the Phaedo, 
Socrates says to Crito, “we owe a cock to Asclepius.  Please don’t forget to pay the debt.”  
Owing a debt to Asclepius, the God of Healing, begs the question, does Socrates see death as a 
cure to life?  The Apology delineates death’s possible outcomes into nothingness or a 
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continuation of the Socratic pursuit of truth.  The Phaedo too suggests that the continued pursuit 
of knowledge in the afterlife should negate a fear of death.  These works express a view similar 
to the Christian idea of existence, in which mortal life is a transition or a trial before entry into 
eternal happiness is granted.  Undoubtedly, the Socratic pursuit of truth influenced the Christian 
pursuit of a relationship with God.  Both views align with a nihilist outlook by suggesting that 
mortal life is not meaningful in itself, but only as a means to an end after death. (Plato 2002b, 81, 
83)
 In the Republic, Socrates considers every element of the polis’s daily life in his search for 
justice via the analogy of the city.  Among these elements is Greek drama; comedy and tragedy.  
In the construction of his ideal city, Socrates describes tragic art as “something rather 
unreasonable, full of causes apparently without effects and effects apparently without causes; the 
whole moreover so motley and manifold that it could not but be repugnant to a sober mind, and a 
dangerous tinder for sensitive and susceptible souls.”  This description is very similar to 
Socrates’s description of the tyrant’s existence in Book IX of the Republic, “Then, the tyrannical 
soul--I’m talking about the whole soul--will also be least likely to do what it wants and, forcibly 
driven by the stings of a dronish gadfly, will be full of disorder and regret.”  The correlation 
between the emotional irrationality summoned by tragedy is likened to the absence of self 
control Socrates identifies in the tyrant.  The author rejects the presence of tragedy in the city for 
the same reason that he rejects tyranny; the unfulfilling and unjust existence that is a product of 
uncontrollable and irrational emotion.  He favors, instead, the just pursuit of truth that will give 
life meaning and purpose.  (Plato 1992, 89, 248)
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 Socrates believes, or claims to believe, in an absolute truth.  Only the search for this truth 
through the practice of philosophy gives life a satisfying purpose and, Plato believes, composes 
the only alternative to the life of the tyrant.  Nietzsche does not believe in the existence of an 
absolute truth.  Furthermore, he believes our search for such a truth will never give us 
fulfillment.  He argues instead that we will discover the absence of truth once we have exhausted 
our search.  In the meantime, believing this search will be fruitful will have destroyed our ability 
to deal with the realities of our existence.  The promise of absolute truth or Christian redemption 
is similar to the feeling of hope.  Once one has experienced the promise of hope, it is almost 
impossible to reorient oneself to an absence of that feeling.  Having accepted the existence of the 
summum bonum, our ability to understand life as lacking a “correct” explanation or path will be 
difficult, if not impossible, to recover.  Nietzsche’s view is not simply that we will be 
unpleasantly surprised when we discover that absolute truth does not exist, but along the way 
submission to the self-denial that is necessary for its pursuit will have had its own harmful effect. 
By denying ourselves for sake of something that does not exist, we have missed out on important 
facets of life and means of self-development.  
  In the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche describes the Socratic search by saying, 
  “So as to abolish hidden, undetected, unwitnessed suffering from the world and 
  honestly to deny it, one was in the past virtually compelled to invent gods and 
  genii of all the heights and depths, in short something that roams even in secret, 
  hidden places, sees even in the dark, and will not easily let an interesting painful 
  spectacle pass unnoticed.  For it was with the aid of such inventions that life then 
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  knew how to work the trick which it has always known how to work, that of 
  justifying itself, of justifying its ‘evil’.” (Nietzsche 1989, 68)
Nietzsche rejects not only the Socratic pursuit of truth, but the foundation of the Christian 
tradition and the framework of modern science.  Nietzsche argues that Socrates’s pursuit of 
justice and logic has been recreated in the form of the Christian pursuit of God, which explains 
our suffering, what Plato might describe as a disordering of our souls, as a temporary test of our 
faith.  Pursuing a relationship with God replaces the Socratic pursuit of truth through knowledge.  
“We men of knowledge of today, we godless men and anti-metaphysicians, we too, still derive 
our flame from the fire ignited by a faith millennia old, the Christian faith, which was also 
Plato’s, that God is truth, that truth is divine.” (Nietzsche 1989, 152)  
 Nietzsche argues that modern science, too, is an extension of the Socratic pursuit and 
needs the ascetic ideal, a lifestyle in which we deny ourselves momentary pleasures in favor of a 
greater achievement in the future, to be perpetuated.  
  “This pair, science and the ascetic ideal, both rest on the same foundation--I have 
  already indicated it: on the same overestimation of truth (more exactly: on the 
  same belief that truth is inestimable and cannot be criticized).  Therefore they are 
  necessarily allies, so that they are to be fought they can only be fought and called 
  in question together.” (Nietzsche 1989, 153)
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Nietzsche resists the practice of seeking a single meaningful end, believing it will eventually 
become obvious that such an end does not exist. 
 Nietzsche, instead, believes life’s meaninglessness can be disguised and life can 
perpetuated by the aestheticization of reality through beauty and illusion.  This requires, 
however, a recognition of what we are aestheticizing; what human flaws and shortcomings we 
are disguising.  If we saw the reality of our lives, we would be filled with despair and cease to 
desire existence.  For Nietzsche, the arts have the potential to give us some reprieve from such 
despair.  “Having looked boldly right into the terrible destructiveness of so-called world history 
as well as the cruelty of nature, and being in danger of longing for a Buddhistic negation of the 
will.  Art saves him, and through art--life.” (Nietzsche 2000a, 59)  The arts, among them tragic 
drama and music, give us the means to live our lives despite human imperfection.  Nietzsche’s 
objection to the ascetic lifestyle advocated by and developed from the Socratic pursuit of 
knowledge to the priest who denies himself in the name of God lies in the unwillingness of both 
to acknowledge the root of this suffering.  In the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche describes the 
priest as pursuing a temporary and circuitous method of dealing with hopelessness.  “He combats 
only the suffering itself, the discomfiture of the sufferer, not its cause, not the real sickness: this 
must be our fundamental objection to priestly medication.” (Nietzsche 1989, 130)  The priest 
assumes self-denial as a way of life.  His reward for this discipline lies in the afterlife.  In 
contrast, the ascetic ideal practiced by the philosopher or the author for the sake of improving 
their craft is something Nietzsche admires.  Art, too, provides a means of dealing with existence 
that is illusionary.  The difference is that the artist is aware of the illusion.  The priest, or devout 
Christian, believes the daily comforts religion provides are in fact connected to a God, an 
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afterlife, and redemption.  Nietzsche believes that the artist’s awareness of the illusion makes 
him superior to the priest.  By being aware of the illusion, the artist is more honest, more 
connected to the realities of existence, and therefore able to live a more fulfilling life.  The 
artist’s honesty allows him to attribute real value to the experiences of life, rather than masking 
them with the promise of elusive rewards.3  
 While the ideal city of the Republic is meant as an analogy to the soul, Plato also 
demonstrates through its construction that the life of tyranny is a bad one for politics.  The 
tyrant’s life is one in which he is a slave to momentary desires and seeks, but never finds, 
fulfillment in power and possessions correlates to a meaningless view of existence.  For the 
tyrant, the satisfaction of desire becomes the meaning of life, but desire’s inability to ever be 
permanently satisfied prevents the tyrant from finding fulfillment.  Such individuals cannot 
coexist in a fruitful political environment.  Their investment in their own wants and needs 
prevents them from acting to benefit the whole.  Even in the ideal city, the guardians that rule are 
concerned for the well-being of the entire city, rather than their own individual or class benefit.  
The tyrant’s inability to see a meaningful pursuit outside of himself makes it impossible for him 
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3 Allan Bloom (1987) provides support for the presence of nihilism in the Platonic dialogues and the contrast 
between Plato and Nietzsche’s view of asceticism.  As part of his evaluation of the American system of higher 
education, Bloom explores the incarnation of nihilism in America.  His discussion of this phenomenon begins 
around value relativism, a concept which has become part of American discourse, or so he says.  This relativism 
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dispelled.  For Nietzsche this was an unparalleled catastrophe; it meant the decomposition of culture and the loss of 
human aspiration.”  Bloom’s identification of culture and aspiration as footholds for avoiding nihilism are a pinnacle 
of the view of nihilism I discuss in Nietzsche.  “The Socratic ‘examined’ life was no longer possible or desirable.  It 
was itself unexamined, and if there was any possibility of a human life in the future it must begin from the naive 
capacity to live an unexamined life.”  This statement correlates with the value Nietzsche puts on the intoxication and 
self-forgetting Dionysian experience of tragedy.  Bloom’s writing lends support to the idea that nihilism is a concern 
for both Nietzsche and Plato. 
to set aside his dedication to his own momentary pleasures and devote himself to something 
greater.  The absence of political interaction under tyrannical rule provides no benefits for 
combatting nihilism.  Political interaction offers two means of preventing by nihilism, and 
tyranny’s resistance to such interaction makes it particularly undesirable.  The first way in which 
political interaction gives life meaning is its ability to combat feelings of isolation, which prevent 
the development of feelings of unity amongst fellow men.  The nihilist view, which lacks a sense 
of purpose or direction, makes it difficult for individuals to feel connected with others by the 
common experiences life can offer.  The second means by which political interaction can give 
life purpose is its ability to prevent apathy, which dissuades individuals from becoming part of a 
plurality that works together towards a common goal with others.  Not only can nihilism lead one 
to feel isolated and consequently struggle to care for others, but it provides no motivation to 
work with others towards a greater, common goal.  Nihilism is not only a threat to the 
individual’s quality of life, but stands in the way of successful politics.
 
2. Tragedy
 Nietzsche believes, among other things, that nihilism can be avoided through the 
seduction of tragic drama.  Tragic drama and music are discussed in the Republic in two ways.  
The first is the role that music is allowed to play in the education of the city’s guardians.  The 
second is whether there exists a place for the presentation of tragic drama in the ideal city.  These 
become two distinct questions.  Music, when isolated, can be an educational tool for honing 
tastes and a political tool for inspiring certain emotions.  Tragic drama, however, is ultimately 
banned from the city because of its ability to summon unreasonable reactions.  Socrates’s fear of 
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the misuse of music and the power of tragedy in the Republic continues to suggest a fear that 
human life might naturally lack a specific purpose.  Life only attains meaning and purpose with 
the proper manipulation of music’s influence.  Otherwise, tragedy and its depiction of short-
sightedness, hubris, and the unpleasant ends which accompany such actions, as well as its 
unreasonable emotional appeal to audiences, does not serve the pursuit of truth Socrates seeks.  
 The education and grooming of the guardians of the ideal city is discussed at length in 
Book III.  While Socrates expands on the point in Book II that a good education given to the 
guardians of the ideal city must include music and poetry, both must be carefully monitored.  
Because the arts are representations of reality, they are removed from truth and therefore are in 
opposition to what is sought by philosophy.  The discussion of proper education begins with an 
analysis of the stories children will be allowed to hear.  All kinds of preventative measures are 
taken to ensure that children become the best citizens possible, including the selection of a 
certain style of delivery.  This is due to the ability of stories to inspire imitation, particularly 
those told in an imitative style as opposed to pure narrative. (Plato 1992, 70)  Only heroic stories 
that honor the gods and promote the best actions are allowed.  Socrates accuses tragedy and 
comedy, “narrative through imitation,” as distracting the guardians from their work as “craftsmen 
of the city’s freedom” by promoting the imitation of things other than perfect leadership.  The 
Republic does not credit children with the ability to have their own experiences and gather the 
appropriate take-aways.  Tragedy continues to pose a threat to adults and ultimately all citizens 
are kept from observing it.  In Socrates’s view, the only reaction people are capable of having 
towards their experiences is emulation and to emulate the actions of tragic heroes would be very 
problematic for the operation of the city.  
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 In addition to the threat of imitation that the dramatic arts poses, the Republic states that 
comedy makes a mockery of the stories, gods, and values, which the city has established.  
Comedic writers, like Aristophanes and his work the Clouds, make similar claims of mockery 
about philosophy.  These claims are based on the idea that philosophers are looking to replace the 
traditional histories and gods with their own logical explanations, but Plato’s Socrates believes 
that these gods and histories should not only be revered, but revised so as to seem always 
virtuous and correct.  If stories in which the gods act foolishly are permitted, then “everyone will 
be ready to excuse himself when he’s bad, if he is persuaded that similar things both are being 
done now and have been done in the past by close descendants of the gods.”  For the sake of the 
ideal city, the gods are to be beacons of good behavior.  Service to them is not, as it is in the 
Christian tradition, the summum bonum, but their presence in human history should function as 
examples of virtue.  Socrates seeks to eliminate all excuses for irrational, emotion-driven actions, 
and so those stories in which the gods too behave badly are edited or removed from the poetic 
repertoire. (Plato 1992, 68)
 In a greater offense, tragedy presents stories with unsettling conclusions that result from 
the unwise actions of the main characters.  Socrates believes the kind of poor choices that lead 
these characters to their tragic ends corrupt the viewer with the suggestion of such behavior, and 
that the power of their presentation will lead to inevitable imitation.  The theater setting provides 
the spectator with the experience of both a sense of safety in the wake of the tragedy on-stage, as 
well as a sense of awe at the unfolding plot.  These factors, when combined with the power of 
music are believed to lead the audience to imitate the actions they observe in these pieces.  These 
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types of musical dramas are therefore banned from the ideal city.  Neither tragedy, nor those 
capable of performing it, will be permitted to exist in the city.
  “It seems, then, that if a man, who through clever training can become anything 
  and imitate anything should arrive in our city,wanting to give a performance of his 
  poems, we should bow down before him as someone holy, wonderful, and 
  pleasing, but we should tell him that there is no one like him in our city and that it 
  is unlawful for there to be.  We should pour myrrh on his head, crown him with 
  wreaths, and send him away to another city.” (Plato 1992, 74)
This is another extreme preventative measure.  The fear that some might be moved to imitate the 
poor choices they see on the stage outweighs the possibility that citizens could gather a kind of 
wisdom from the vicarious experience of watching the tragedy that befalls those who make such 
poor choices, a position that will be advocated by Aristotle.
 While tragedy necessitates the experience of an event in the presence of others, music 
warrants its own exploration as something encountered by the individual, and the Republic 
addresses it additionally and separately from tragedy.  While the content of songs and odes will 
be required to conform to the guidelines already in place for stories, Socrates says that the 
rhythms and modes must also fit the carefully selected texts. (Plato 1992, 74)  Socrates outlaws 
certain scale modes, including those which convey a lamenting attitude.  The soft modes, which 
he identifies as being suitable for drinking parties and encouraging drunkenness, softness, and 
idleness, are said to be “relaxed” and should also be banned from the city.  He asks to be left 
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simply with two modes; one for promoting courage and one for promoting self-control.  Socrates 
requires the same thing of meter, eliminating all but that which inspires courageous actions and 
displays of moderation.  Given these strict rules, I believe we can deduce that Plato believes 
people are not capable of feeling an emotion, especially when it is inspired through music, 
without acting on it, or being internally corrupted by it.  A viewer might be led to harbor feelings 
of jealousy against his neighbor without ever acting them out.  This life would still be one filled 
with the kind of unhappiness that the Socratic pursuit attempts to avoid through truth.  Knowing 
the truth allows us not only to understand our own existence, but also the lives of others and 
explains any inconsistencies we might be offended by otherwise.  In Book III, Socrates says, 
“fine words, harmony, grace, and rhythm follow simplicity of character”, in the sense of a “fine 
and good character that has developed in accordance with an intelligent plan” and that 
“gracelessness, bad rhythm, and disharmony are akin to bad words and bad character.” (Plato 
1992, 77)  This kind of classicism, he believes, will provide exposure to only the modes, words, 
and rhythms that are deemed courageous and respectable and will always produce lovers of the 
fine and beautiful.  What music is capable of adding to the impact of tragedy is the ability to 
elicit emotions beyond logic.  Socrates is portrayed as believing that the possibility for emotions 
to be elicited in reaction to the aural experience means music can produce a reaction so powerful 
that one would uncontrollably perform undesirable actions associated with these feelings.  
 The purpose of banning stories that promote undesirable action is obvious, in that 
imitation of these characters will lead individuals to act destructively in the city, although the 
claim that hearing these stories would lead to such actions remains questionable.  Yet, the 
aversion to the musical element expressed in the Republic, especially its ability to elicit feelings 
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of sadness, idleness, or softness is not quite so clear.  The modes that Socrates describes, he 
believes not only convey a narrative content of the lamenting or the “relaxed”, but, like stories 
with similar content, they inspire inappropriate actions or inaction.  “Drunkenness, softness, and 
idleness are also most inappropriate for our guardians.” (Plato 1992, 75)  On the other hand, 
Socrates believes music that promotes courage or moderation is to be valued, and can be used 
politically to summon particular responses from the city’s citizens.  Socrates likens harmonizing 
the parts of the soul so that each performs its proper function to the limiting notes of a musical 
scale.  
  “He puts himself in order, is his own friend, and harmonizes the three parts of 
  himself like three limiting notes in a musical scale--high, low, and middle.  He 
  binds together those parts and any others there may be in between, and from 
  having been many things he becomes entirely one, moderate and harmonious.” 
  (Plato 1992, 119)
It is not clearly laid out in the text that the author believes imitation is the only reaction possible 
to the experience of such stories of feelings, but his need to omit them from the education of the 
guardians, and from the polis more broadly, it seems to me, cannot be interpreted any other way.   
Imitation, a characteristic of all the arts including music and drama, is a vice in that it is one or 
more steps removed from the truth.  According to Book X of the Republic, even artists are aware 
that they cannot create true representations.  “I could make them appear, but I couldn’t make the 
things themselves as they truly are.”  The tragedian is among these craftsmen. (Plato 1992, 266)
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 The issue of the intelligibility of art and music is also problematic for Plato.  For him, 
intelligibility is a requisite for something to be beautiful and good.  We cannot appreciate 
something’s beauty if we are unable to understand it and it can be understood to be beautiful by 
understanding its construction.  Tragedy’s ability to elicit inexplicable emotional reaction makes 
its beauty unintelligible.  According to Socrates in the Apology, even the tragic poets are unable 
to understand the power of their work. 
  “And so, in the case of the poets as well, I soon realized it wasn’t wisdom that 
  enabled them to compose their poems, but some sort of natural inspiration, of just 
  the sort you find in prophets and soothsayers.” (Plato 2002a, 34)  
In the Republic, Plato continues this thread with Socrates’s statement, “Then imitation is far 
removed from the truth, for it touches only a small part of each thing and a part that is itself only 
an image.”  Not only is what is created in the arts determined to be a lesser version of what it 
represents, Socrates goes on to describe the creator as being necessarily unfamiliar with the truth 
of what he attempts to represent.  “If he truly had knowledge of the things he imitates, he’d be 
much more serious about actions than about imitations of them.”  The tragedian’s inability to 
understand his craft makes its danger all the more pronounced. (Plato 1992, 268, 296)
 In Chapter Four, “Arts of Experience, Politics of Expression,” of  Brian Massumi’s 
forthcoming book, Semblance and Event, the author suggests two impacts of music, delineated 
by a distinction between program music and absolute music.  Program music is music written 
with specific reference or representation of a particular event, picture, or story.  Absolute music, 
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written with no such extra-musical references, is considered “music for music’s sake.”  Massumi 
argues that absolute music produces inescapable “affective/qualitative-relational order[s] of 
experience.”  These relationships are built not on the “word-line” order through which we 
compile an impression from objective and concrete input, but rather on what we feel.  While 
program music specifically and solely imitates to relay its extra-musical subject matter, absolute 
music draws on a non-specific element of the Sublime, in the Kantian sense of awe inspired by 
fear.  Mahler’s compositions serve as the example of absolute music. (Massumi forthcoming, ms. 
8)4 
  “His music would be intensely imagistic, but would make it an ‘imagery without 
  reference’ (237)... The composition retains its properly musical force of 
  expression, so powerfully enveloping the imagistic elements that the virtual 
  visualization is converted into an immanent music-force without remainder.  This 
  becoming-immanent to the music of the imagery, according to Mahler, was so 
  complete that it could take the place of actual vision.”5 (Massumi forthcoming, 
  ms. 38)
Massumi is referring to a famous story in which, while walking in the mountains, Mahler tells a 
companion, “No need to look--I have already composed all that away.” (Ashby 2010, 222)  The 
ability of a musical work to embody, even negate, the presence of a mountain range without 
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relying on programmatic or imitative musical gestures describes an effect of absolute music that 
is frighteningly powerful.
 I believe the musical element of tragic drama, the chorus, is most likely to fall into the 
category of absolute music.  Two points lead to this conclusion.  The first is that program music 
is typically used to represent something extra-musical, such as a herd of sheep in Strauss’s Don 
Quixote.  The need for the music to represent these extra-musical elements is the result of an 
absence of visual cues, which are present in tragic drama.  While visual drama also sometimes 
use programmatic music, it does not tend to be the foundation of the works, as is the case with 
the tragedy’s chorus or modern opera.  The second is the power with which the Republic 
describes the experience of tragedy, constructed largely around the music of the chorus.  The 
power Massumi (I think correctly) ascribes to absolute music sounds much more like the 
unreasonable call to action Socrates fears in tragedy.  However, the imitative characteristics 
music can possess (program music, for the purposes of this discussion) are identified and the 
musical element is then rejected for being removed from truth.  While the strong inexplicable 
emotional responses elicited by absolute music seem like a greater threat to the hierarchy in 
which reason rules spirit and desire, the Republic more explicitly identifies the undesirable 
imitative nature characteristic of program music as a threat to knowing the truth.  Absolute music 
and program music exist along a continuum, but I believe the threat Plato sees music posing, one 
that bypasses logic, is much more characteristic of pure absolute music.  Absolute music’s ability 
to affect our emotions without explicit extra-musical points of reference makes it more powerful 
and more difficult to describe, even identify.  Plato’s failure to explain his dismissal of certain 
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musics on these grounds demonstrates these characteristics of absolute music and its own way of 
eluding the explanation-driven Socratic pursuit of truth.
 Massumi’s writing also offers an explanation of the fear of tragedy and the misuse of 
music expressed in the Republic.  “Language may be the most complete archive of nonsensuous 
similarity, but the technique of ritual shows that it is eminently possible to activate and 
disseminate relation by predominately nonverbal means.” (Massumi forthcoming, ms. 17)  
Massumi’s work suggests that music (absolute music in particular), like language, can allow us 
to draw connections between experiences that one has actually had and relatable experiences of 
others, which we have not experienced directly.  
“It follows that any differential attuning of sensuous forms to each other is a way 
of performing virtual events, permuting or inventing nonsensuous similarities, and 
producing speculatively pragmatic truths, or semblances fore-tracing them.  
Sensuous forms may also constitute an ‘archive’ of relational 
experience.” (Massumi forthcoming, ms. 17)
The term sensuous forms I understand to correlate to felt experience, something we have 
experienced with our own senses.  According to Massumi, a result of attributing outcomes of our 
direct experience to things that music or tragedy only allows us to believe we’ve experienced 
requires a faith in the ability of humans to draw accurate connections between such experiences.  
The semblance of truth to be found in drawing such connections depends on “years of hard 
training, the practiced technique and the meticulously prepared collective context necessary for 
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the event of its performance.”  Performance produces an experience that is a “collective availing 
of the creative powers of the false incumbent in all experience.  It is less a hallucination in the 
pejorative sense than an invoked relational reality.”  (Massumi forthcoming, ms. 16)  As 
listeners, we must be properly trained to draw useful connections between our own experiences 
and illusions produced by music or drama.  The practice of appropriate and careful listening 
allows us to invoke an experience of the illusion that is like experiencing the event portrayed 
directly.  Yet constructing of these semblances of truth create opportunities for the construction 
of false truths,  
  “alternate future paths for the world that extend its qualitative-relational universe 
  of life and the forms of life that potentially co-compose through it.  Language 
  [and in this context, tragedy], seen from this perspective, harbors what Deleuze 
  calls ‘powers of the false.’... Powers of the false yet correspond to no truth, for the 
  simple reason that they produce truths.”  (Massumi forthcoming, ms. 13)
This creation of false truths inaccurately drawn from a connection between what is vicariously 
experienced through tragedy and what can be determined to be true may be part of the fear of 
tragedy’s power expressed in the Republic.6  We must be trained to draw accurate connections 
between our own experiences and experiences relayed by the arts.  Without proper training, there 
exists a danger, for example, that the awe we feel for the drastic actions of tragic heroes would 
lead us to imitate them, rather than to learn from their mistakes or simply admire their ability to 
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act.  Massumi’s writing provides us with more ways of understanding the Republic’s stance on 
tragedy and its musical element.  He both articulates the overwhelming and inexplicable abilities 
of music to inspire a powerful reaction, as well as the potential for drawing false connections 
between our own experiences and the experiences observing tragedy lead us to feel we have had.
 Nietzsche, in contrast to Plato, believes tragedy can help give our lives meaning.  In his 
early work The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche traces the history of Greek tragic art and its roots in 
the characteristics of the gods Apollo and Dionysus, both of whom are evoked through music.  
He introduces the Apollonian and Dionysian initially as separate worlds; those of dreams and 
intoxication respectively.  Apollo is a “ruler over the beautiful illusion of the inner world of 
fantasy... the symbolical analogue of the soothsaying faculty and of the arts generally, which 
makes life possible and worth living.”  The Apollonian “illusion” veils the world in a manner 
that makes it appear valuable, “which must have triumphed over an abysmal and terrifying view 
of the world and the keenest susceptibility to suffering through recourse to the most forceful and 
pleasurable illusions.”  By contrast, Nietzsche describes the Dionysian man as having “looked 
truly into the essence of things, they have gained knowledge, and nausea inhibits action.”  
Shakespeare’s Hamlet is the example that Nietzsche cites as the Dionysian man, truly capable of 
seeing the reality of things and their unchangeable and ridiculous nature. (Nietzsche 2000a, 35, 
43, 60)  
 Dionysus offers us something analogous to intoxication.  The Dionysian state provides a 
community in which man’s oneness with others is reaffirmed in a state of frenzied self-
forgetting.  “The artistic power of all nature reveals itself to the highest gratification of the 
primordial unity.” (Nietzsche 2000a, 37)  In the Dionysian state, man forgets his rigid, illusory 
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status and trajectory, and becomes simply a part of a communal whole which includes fellow 
men, as well as nature.
  “For the rapture of the Dionysian state with its annihilation of the ordinary bounds 
  and limits of existence contains, while it lasts, a lethargic element in which all 
  personal experiences of the past become immersed.  This chasm of oblivion 
  separates the worlds of everyday reality and of Dionysian reality.  But as soon as 
  this everyday reality re-enters consciousness, it is experienced as such, with 
  nausea: an ascetic, will-negating mood is the fruit of these states.” (Nietzsche 
  2000a, 59)
Hamlet, as the man who has been through the Dionysian experience, assumes an approach to life 
that is the result of seeing existence the way Nietzsche fears, becoming uninspired to seek 
meaning and to sink oneself into the forgetful powers of tragic drama.  While discussing the 
Dionysian festivals of Greek life, Nietzsche broaches the subject of music specifically, which 
excites “awe and terror.”  Music, which originally belonged to the Apollonian art as a simply 
rhythmic representation of dream states, endowed with melody, becomes Dionysian in its 
emotional power. (Nietzsche 2000a, 40)
 Greek tragedy, for Nietzsche, is the result of a marriage of these two states, dreams and 
ecstasies, and originates in the tragic chorus.  The chorus provides an element beyond the poetry 
which creates a world infinitely greater in its depth, and therefore in its ability to affect the 
audience.
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  “Language can never adequately render the cosmic symbolism of music, because 
  music stands in symbolic relation to the primordial contradiction and primordial 
  pain in the heart of the primal unity, and therefore symbolizes a sphere which is 
  beyond and prior to all phenomena.” (Nietzsche 2000a, 55)
The part of Greek tragedy which is dramatic action serves the Apollonian, creating illusions 
through which the audience sees the world from new perspectives.  Nietzsche identifies the 
chorus as the Dionysian element of tragedy because of its power to nullify the viewer, “that the 
state and society and, quite generally, the gulfs between man and man give way to an 
overwhelming feeling of unity leading back to the very heart of nature.” (Nietzsche 2000a, 59)  
The importance of the role of music in Nietzsche’s evaluation of tragedy is underlined by his 
identification of Wagner’s operas as the rebirth of the tragic drama.7  Another musical work that 
might provide a parallel to the combination of Apollonian and Dionysian elements of tragedy is 
the first movement of Mahler’s Fifth Symphony.  This movement, Trauermarsch, opens with 
rhythmic and timbral gestures which create the illusion of a funeral march.  At one point, the 
strings break from the dirge into frenetic scales, what Theodor Adorno calls “a shriek of horror at 
something worse than death.” (Adorno 1992, 20)  This frenzy might be analogous to the self-
forgetting element of the Dionysian.  The sense of losing control of oneself, in this case, as a 
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response to overwhelming despair is the quality summoned by the Dionysian through the chorus 
in tragic drama. 
  The fear that nihilism can destroy both the individual pursuit of fulfillment and 
productive political interaction leads Nietzsche and Plato to seek sources of meaning for human 
existence.  In tragedy, Nietzsche finds the combination of the Apollonian illusion and the 
Dionysian state of self-forgetting aggrandizes human struggles and provides an escape from 
individual burdens of existence.  In the Republic, Plato seems to be concerned with the 
unpredictable nature of emotion and fears tragedy’s power to create illusion and allow us to 
forget ourselves.  Instead, he seeks a pursuit of knowledge that leads to truth and promotes a 
hierarchy and balance of wisdom, emotion, and spirit within the soul.  The musical element of 
tragedy can benefit this pursuit if it is limited to the inspiration of certain desirable emotional 
responses at the appropriate times.  Nietzsche’s willingness to take a broader view of tragedy’s 
benefits, while they are not all truth-driven, provides more ways for us to engage with others and 
retain the courage to live our lives. 
3. Politics as Unity
 Aristotle offers an alternative to the perspectives of Plato and Nietzsche on tragedy.  His 
discussion of tragic drama presents two political benefits that could result from its observation.  
The first is an edifying experience similar to the Dionysian state described by Nietzsche through 
which our understanding and sympathy for one another is cultivated.  The second is a balanced 
discourse, which we observe as part of the performance, and which serves as a model for 
successful political interaction.  Aristotelian politics are harmonious and mimic performance.  
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Successful and deliberative political interaction comes as a result of multiple perspectives 
working in concert to achieve something as a group.
 The educational element of tragedy that Aristotle sees as a benefit to politics is what he 
calls katharsis, a feeling of pity and fear for the characters.  What Aristotle means by pity and 
fear is slightly different from our conventional use of these words.  Pity is more like empathy, 
“suffering with.”  It does not have the same sense of condescension about it that pity traditionally 
does.  Fear’s definition is one closer to awe; an appropriate correlation might be to the Sublime, 
which moves us by being dangerous and frightening.  Aristotle’s word katharsis, or catharsis, is 
used interchangeably with purgation, purification, and clarification in Eugene Garver’s glossary 
to S.H. Butcher’s translation of the Poetics.  Catharsis comes from the Greek kathairein “to 
purify, purge” and from katharos “pure, clear of dirt, clean, spotless; open, free; clear of shame 
or guilt; purified.”  (Aristotle 2005, 506)  This etymology suggests the experience of fear and 
pity is one through which our own consciences are purified, as we observe our inherent flaws 
aggrandized in performance.  Aristotle also believes experiencing an event, a decision, or an 
emotion, is a better way of attaining knowledge; one that has a longer-lasting effect.  Tragedy is 
able to present both a purification, as well as better understanding.  
  “Tragedy, then, is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a 
  certain magnitude; in language embellished with each kind of artistic ornament, 
  the several kinds being found in separate parts of the play; in the form of action, 
  not of narrative; through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation [catharsis] of 
  these emotions.”  (Aristotle 2005, 1449b24-32)
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The framework in which tragic art is performed allows the audience to experience the events 
portrayed on stage as if they were real and happening to each observer.  A combination of staging 
and use of music, particularly the chorus, achieves this effect.  Just as movies present a story and 
characters who exist outside the potential influence and interaction with the viewer, tragic drama 
gives the audience a glimpse into the unalterable lives of its characters.  Catharsis gives us a 
level of understanding, what Aristotle means by “pity,” of the action and the actors that cannot be 
garnered any other way, save perhaps having the very experience ourselves.  
  “The cause of this again is, that to learn gives the liveliest pleasure, not only to 
  philosophers but to men in general; whose capacity, however, of learning is more 
  limited.  Thus the reason why men enjoy seeing a likeness is, that in 
  contemplating it they find themselves learning or inferring, and says perhaps, ‘Ah, 
  that is he.’” (Aristotle 2005, 1448b13-17)
 P. Christopher Smith (1999) suggests that the quintessential difference between Aristotle 
and Plato’s view of tragedy is their position on the elements of melody, meter, and rhythm.  
While Aristotle believes that these elements are instrumental to the cathartic effect he praises, 
Plato sees these elements as simply disguising the representation he finds so corruptive.  
According to Smith, Aristotle believes the emotions elicited by the musical element of tragedy 
affects us in a way that is equivalent to having the active experience that might elicit those same 
emotional responses.  Aristotle advocates for the benefits of this “direct experience.”  Tapping 
Batstone  29
into the skills that can be acquired and the knowledge that is attained by experiencing this 
katharsis requires the observation of tragedy.  To remain anti-tragedy, it therefore becomes 
necessary for Plato to take a stand against this kind of knowledge altogether.  Aristotle’s 
definition of human nature argues that imitative learning is natural and tragedy simply appeals to 
this nature through reenactment; “We have learned by undergoing.”
 Nietzsche’s description of the outcomes of the self-forgetting state of the Dionysian 
element of tragic drama in The Birth of Tragedy is similar to Aristotle’s catharsis.  The Dionysian 
state allows us to experience something outside the immediate realm of our personal experiences. 
The moment of self-forgetting is conducive to reaffirming connections with others through an 
impression of oneness.  
  “Now all the rigid, hostile barriers that necessity, caprice, or ‘impudent 
  convention’ have fixed between man and man are broken.  Now, with the gospel 
  of universal harmony, each one feels himself not only united, reconciled, and 
  fused with his neighbor, but as one with him, as if the veil of maya had been torn 
  aside and were now merely fluttering in tatters before the mysterious primordial 
  unity.” (Nietzsche 2000a, 37)
The ability to experience this sense of fusion with others lays a foundation for vicarious learning. 
When one feels united with others, internalizing their experiences becomes possible.  The 
vicarious experience is what Aristotle values in tragedy and believes can have an educational 
benefit stronger than any logical investigation.
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 Aristotle and Nietzsche also share the view that tragic drama gives an aura of greatness to 
the flaws of mankind.  Tragedy, as a representation, portrays men to be greater than they are.  
Tragic heroes inspire a sense of awe in their willingness to go too far for what they believe.  
“The same distinction marks off Tragedy from Comedy; for Comedy aims at representing men as 
worse, Tragedy as better than in actual life” (Aristotle 2005, 1448a18-20)  Flawed and impulsive 
actions, such as hubris, despite their often tragic consequences, warrant their own admiration.  
The characteristics of tragic heroes, while not always in themselves desirable, contain a 
determination to act at all that promotes a sense of knowledge and confidence to be admired.  
Aristotle says of tragedy, “Imitation, then is one instinct of our nature... The graver spirits 
imitated noble actions, and the actions of good men” (Aristotle 2005, 1448b20-25).  In tragedy, 
the nobler characters, although often misled, attempted serious actions as a solution to their 
predicaments.  The inclination to approach a problem with a course of serious action is itself a 
sign of good character.  Tragedy, because it portrays a change in fortune from good to bad as a 
result “not of vice, but of some great error or frailty, in character” is capable of giving us the 
impression that such errors and such changes in fortune, are human and unite us around common 
character traits. (Aristotle 2005, 1453a14)  Our faults become a part of an honorable struggle that  
is natural and shared, rather than one that comes as a result of avoidable and individual vice.  
Despite their tragic conclusions, the struggles tragic heroes encounter are the kind of struggle 
that many will encounter to some degree and the conviction with which they approach the 
struggle is admirable.  In this way, Aristotle sees tragedy as having the potential to create an 
empathetic response that better understands struggle, possible ways of dealing with it and the 
sense that others share similar struggles.  
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 Ultimately, however, Aristotle sees tragedy as an experience of vicarious lesson-learning.   
A student of Plato, Aristotle agrees in the pursuit for truth and that the practice of philosophy can 
help us uncover the summum bonum.  After opening the Politics with his famous statement, 
“Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political 
animal,”  Aristotle begins a migration from this bid for man’s need to participate politically 
towards one for the Platonic practice of philosophy. (Aristotle 1996, 1253a1-2)   In Book VII of 
the Politics, he delineates two versions of the best life.  The first is the life of the statesman, the 
second the life of the freeman.  The best life is determined to be an active one, but Aristotle 
defines action in a variety of ways.  
  “If we are right in our view, and happiness is assumed to be acting well, the active 
  life will be the best, both for every city collectively, and for individuals.  Not that 
  a life of action must necessarily have relation regarded as practical which are 
  pursued for the sake of practical results, but much more the thoughts and 
  contemplations which are independent and complete in themselves; since acting 
  well, and therefore a certain kind of action, is an end, and even in the case of 
  external actions the directing mind is most truly said to act.” (Aristotle 1996, 
  1325b15-22) 
By placing the same value on the actions of the politically engaged citizen as the philosopher, 
Aristotle begins to express his preference for a life in pursuit of truth.  Aristotle goes on to say 
that the best man and the best constitution are one and the same.  Successful states are made up 
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of the best men, who require “excellences of leisure.”  The advantages of leisure, which require 
freedom from political activity such as war, include the practice of philosophy.  
  “Those then who seem to be the best-off and to be in the possession of every 
  good, have special need of justice and temperance--for example, those (if such 
  there be, as the poets say) who dwell in the Islands of the Blest; they above all 
  will need philosophy and temperance and justice, and all the more the leisure they 
  have, living in the midst of abundance.” (Aristotle 1996, 1334a27-34)
For Aristotle, leisure produces time for the best man to develop, and this development occurs 
through the Socratic pursuit of truth.  When bound to the political duties created by war or times 
of unrest, we are not capable of pursuing that which truly makes us “best.”
 Aristotle is a constant advocate of moderation and the golden mean.  He believes 
tragedy’s educational benefit lies not only in its potential for better understanding a shared 
human experience, but also understanding the superiority of moderation.  By witnessing the 
tragic consequences of those who take extreme actions, the observer should be encouraged to 
take a moderate approach towards their own struggles.  Aristotle’s view that tragedy might serve 
as an appeal for the golden mean leaves little room for an appreciation of many approaches to 
life’s circumstances, the misfortunes of tragic dramas among them.  Nietzsche would most 
definitely disagree that there is an ideal approach to life, such as Aristotelian moderation.  His 
belief is that the grandeur with which tragic heroes are portrayed offers its own benefit.  The 
actions, however flawed, of the tragic heroes inspire awe in the audience.  The ability of human 
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beings to take drastic actions, however poor, in response to their situation promotes a sense of 
pride, for nothing else but our ability to act.  While this can strengthen the bonds between us, it 
should also give us a sense of individual pride and encouragement.  The idea that stories will be 
told about this event provides an impetus to continue living our lives in spite of our own 
struggles and disappointments.  It is Nietzsche’s interpretation of this facet of tragedy that allows 
him to suggest a lifestyle most conducive to political interaction.  The combination of awe for 
human potential and a rejection of the Aristotelian and Platonic ideas of absolute truth make 
space for reciprocal respect between individuals and multiple possibilities for ways of achieving 
successful co-existence. 
 Plato offers a contrasting position to both those of Nietzsche and Aristotle.  If we read the 
Republic as a serious political proposal, Plato advocates for a social and political structure that 
seeks almost the opposite of the Dionysian sense of oneness with others.  Plato rejects political 
plurality where deliberation is valued and sought after in favor of a dogmatic, hierarchical 
government structure.  The appeal of this structure seems to be its possibilities for consistent and 
successful political outcomes, which rest on the fact that political decision-making is left to the 
wisest members of society, the guardian class.  The Republic argues that the guardians, with their 
superior knowledge and education, will be capable of making decisions that provide the greatest 
benefit to all members of the city.  Individuals who are not members of the guardian class are 
responsible for other parts of society; the auxilliary, those who defend the city, and the producing 
class, those who control and monitor the markets.  Class membership is determined early and 
interaction or mobility between classes is prohibited.  Each class is subject to its own education 
and development, with the guardians receiving the most training.  The Republic’s famous noble 
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lie is designed for the purpose of maintaining a divide between the classes and the prevention of 
the feelings of oneness valued by Nietzsche and Aristotle.  The noble lie explains the hierarchical 
structure of this city in which each of its members belongs to one of three classes; the guardians, 
the auxiliary, or the producers.  In order to promote fraternity and keep individuals from 
questioning their class, they are told that they were all born from the Earth with one of three 
metals in their soul; gold, silver, and bronze, respectively. 
 The training set up for the guardian class is most extensive and, in Book VII of the 
Republic, there is a discussion of the political education the guardians will receive.  The 
guardians are required, beginning at age 35, to undergo fifteen years of political education during 
which time they must, 
  “go down into the cave again, and compel them to take command in matters of 
  war and occupy other offices suitable for young people, so that they won’t be 
  inferior to the others in experience.” (Plato 1992, 211)
The Republic’s concern for the political education of the guardians is significant, taking up half 
of the total time of their education.  Yet the ideal city meets in decline in Book VIII suggesting 
that even Plato believes a city in which the pursuit of knowledge and the proper ordering of 
emotion and spirit as subordinate to reason in both the public and private sense is unrealistic and 
unsustainable, if not unattainable.  In Book VIII, the decline of the kallipolis results from 
inappropriate procreation.  
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  “Now, the people you have educated to be leaders in your city, even though they 
  are wise, still won’t, through calculation together with sense perception, hit upon 
  the fertility and barrenness of the human species, but it will escape them, and so 
  they will at some time beget children when they ought not to do so.” (Plato 1992, 
  216) 
The classes will became tainted through this unjust intermixing and children will cease to be 
worthy of positions as guardians.  The kallipolis’s ultimate decline comes as a result of citizens’s 
inability to remain constrained by the class rules that divide them.  This suggests Plato knows, 
given the chance, most will choose the sense of connectedness to others that Aristotle identifies 
in tragedy over a perfectly divined class system in which each is assigned a role.  He also clearly 
suspects that such a sense will destroy the kind of order required for justice.  Therefore, tragedy 
cannot be permitted to exist in the city and promote such unity. 
 Keeping the city-soul analogy of the Republic in view, tragic drama still presents 
problems that are unrelated to the inevitable fall of the republic.  Tragedy is an event that one 
goes to, experiences, and returns from.  If the city is merely an analogy for the soul, allowing the 
event of tragic drama would require the psyche to split in some way so that one part could 
observe and learn from another.  The aim of Socrates’s discussion of the city is, from the 
beginning, as a way of understanding the soul.  An event, therefore, whose experience 
necessitates an outside world becomes nearly impossible to consider.  Because Socrates is 
dealing with the internal--justice’s value to the individual--he is unable to discuss the benefits of 
events involving groups.  This decision to investigate the soul and consequently reject metaphors 
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that consider multiple entities suggests the underlying message of the Republic might be the 
rejection all facets of the outside world.  Instead, the purpose of Plato’s work might be to 
advocate for a life outside of politics, in which one can freely pursue philosophy, truth, and 
justice; the best life for the individual.
4. Politics as Harmony 
 The experience of being lost in the Dionysian state with fellow observers, in addition to 
its ability to afford a kind of connectedness to others, creates the potential for a greater 
appreciation for plurality; an important political tool for the deliberative politics Aristotle 
imagines.  The musical element is itself a metaphor for the form political discourse should take.  
Aristotle frequently refers to political interaction as a harmony, rather than the unity we find in 
the Republic.  In line 1284b12-13 of the Politics, Aristotle uses the musical metaphor of a chorus 
with one member who is able to sing louder and better than all the rest; of course, they would be 
eliminated from the choral roster.  His comparison of ideal politics to a harmony, versus the unity 
described in the Republic, extends beyond the idea of multiple lines working in concert to create 
the best environment for the greatest number.  He also stresses the balance achieved by well-
performed music in which each part supports all others appropriately.  Executing such a balance 
politically requires that multiple people be involved in the governing process, each performing 
their own part while interacting with others.  This balance produces a responsibility in each 
citizen to care for their role in government while creating a sense of trust in others’ execution of 
their responsibilities.
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 Hannah Arendt, a philosopher heavily influenced by Aristotle, approaches his ideas of 
political plurality and man’s telos as a political animal in her essay, “What is Freedom?”  At the 
conclusion of the first section of the essay Arendt says, “The raison d’ȇtre of politics is freedom 
and that this freedom is primarily experienced in action.” (Arendt 1977, 151)  For Arendt, we are 
most free in the political realm and this freedom manifests itself in the actions we perform for the 
sake of principle, as opposed to need.  
 The space that most people today consider to be freest is the home.  This view is 
especially visible in today’s world, in which the issue of privacy is more and more salient to most 
political discussions.  Yet, Arendt argues that this is in fact the realm in which we are most bound 
to necessity, and least free.  The private, domestic realm is that of particular, physical necessity.  
It requires our continual upkeep to maintain the health and welfare of ourselves and our families.  
These duties are organic and do not disrupt our instinctual actions for self-preservation.  They 
follow a kind of predestined course of action to be found in any species bent on survival.
 It is the public, political realm which is the realm of principle, for Arendt.  It is only in the 
political realm where we are not bound by a survival instinct to act, and instead can act on behalf 
of something greater than our immediate needs and desires.  Political interaction transcends 
private needs.  The actions we are capable of taking in pursuit of something larger than our own 
preservation, Arendt says, are governed by principles.  Human beings are specially endowed with 
the ability to distinctively act for the sake of a principle.  Among such principles are honor, glory, 
equality, virtue, distinction, and excellence as examples.  
 The musical characteristics of political interaction are also a theme Arendt explores.  For 
Aristotle, music is a metaphor for the harmony necessary for successful political interaction.  For 
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Arendt, politics is like a performing art because of its ability to transcend time while 
simultaneously only existing in the moment its creation.  Arendt compares the political act to the 
performing arts.  Performing arts, like music, are events which transcend the present in their 
ability to consume the participants and nullify the individual.  Arendt describes the moment of 
political involvement as one which requires being lost in the action and an utter devotion to what 
one is working towards, similar to the existence of music only at the moment of its performance.  
This description has a strong correlation to Aristotelian ideas of music, in which the work only 
exists the moment it is performed (rather than existing, for example, in the score).  It also aligns 
with the self-forgetting element Nietzsche values in tragedy.  The importance of losing ourselves 
in something greater, particularly those things involving other people, is a possible cure to the 
problem of finding meaning in our existence.  Nietzsche’s emphasis on the importance of self-
forgetting produces a state that is as consuming as the kind of political interaction advocated by 
Aristotle and Arendt.  Nietzsche does not specifically discuss the loss of the individual in a single 
greater pursuit, but his understanding of the individual’s ability to find meaning and purpose in 
an event shared with others creates room for a pursuit like political interaction.  While he does 
not encourage political interaction per se, Nietzsche does value experiences of connectedness 
with others.  
 According to the Republic, political interaction, especially between those who are not 
endowed with the proper ordering of the soul, poses a different risk and contradicts the 
hierarchical system so carefully laid out in the Republic.  Discourse has the potential to 
encourage undesirable behaviors similar to those displayed in tragedy; hubris, short-sightedness, 
arrogance, all reactions to the input of others.  Deliberative politics among individuals ceases to 
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exist in the polis constructed by the Republic.  It seems that, for Plato, politics has only two 
possible outcomes; the static and informed rule of the philosopher or the chaos of interaction that 
produces compromised outcomes which fall short of an ideal.  As an example in Book VIII, 
Socrates describes a democratic system,
  “He often engages in politics, leaping up from his seat and saying and doing 
  whatever comes into his mind.  If he happens to admire soldiers, he’s carried in 
  that direction, if money-makers, in that one.  There’s neither order nor necessity in 
  his life, but he calls it pleasant, free, and blessedly happy, and he follows it for as 
  long as he lives.”  (Plato 1992, 232)
 In his discussion of various forms of government in the Republic, Socrates rejects the 
claim that democracy is a “good” form of government.  His vision of a democratic government is 
one in which anything goes, where people lack direction and are at the mercy of their whims, 
leading to the life of tyranny he works so hard to reject.  In practice, a democracy is probably the 
only other system of those explored in which the pursuit of philosophy would be acceptable.  
None of the other systems discussed in the Republic would happily provide the space for a group 
of individuals to freely pursue the study of philosophy.  Besides the kallipolis, it is only a 
democracy, where a variety of pursuits are considered equal and legitimate, that accommodates 
the life of a philosopher.  This is not lost on Plato.  At the close of Book IX, Socrates argues that 
the man governed by his immediate desires, as a democracy allows, is in danger of becoming a 
tyrant.  
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  “First, he is led to all the kinds of lawlessness that those who are leading him call 
  freedom... Then, when those clever enchanters and tyrant-makers have no hope of 
  keeping hold of the young man in any other way, they contrive to plant in him a 
  powerful erotic love, like a great winged drone, to be the leader of those idle 
  desires that spend whatever is at hand... Then this leader of the soul adopts 
  madness as its bodyguard and becomes frenzied.  If it finds any beliefs or desires 
  in the man that are thought to be good or that still have some shame, it destroys 
  them and throws them out, until it’s purged him of moderation and filled him with 
  imported madness.” (Plato 1992, 243)
Those, however, who are capable of seeing that only philosophy has a truly satiating outcome 
will be permitted to pursue such goals in private.
  “[Socrates] And he’ll [the philosopher] look to the same thing where honors are 
  concerned.  He’ll willing share in and taste those that he believes will make him 
  better, but he’ll avoid any public or private honor that might overthrow the 
  established condition of his soul.
  [Glaucon] If that’s his chief concern, he won’t be willing to take part in politics. 
  [Socrates] Yes, by the dog, he certainly will, at least in his own kind of city.  But 
  he may not be willing to do so in his fatherland, unless some divine good luck 
  chances to be his [that he lives in the kallipolis].” (Plato 1992, 263)
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Yet, unlike the kallipolis, in a democracy philosophy is not regarded as the highest societal good.  
The Republic’s distaste for democracy is that its “live and let live” attitude leaves behind those 
who cannot find their own way to philosophy.  This is evidence that Plato’s concerns about 
nihilism exclude its implications for politics.  He does not consider that the pursuit of a summum 
bonum might take many different forms which a democracy allows for.  Plato’s belief in a single 
absolute truth aligns with the belief, expressed here, that there is only one way to pursue this 
truth.  Even a plurality of experiences along the way to truth, something Aristotle seems to 
believe possible, is rejected. 
 Aristotle’s own exploration of the various forms of government and the ways in which 
they are corrupted in Book III of the Politics is much more generous to those that promote 
pluralism.  While he initially seems to favor the rule of the great to that of the many, identifying 
the benevolent monarch and the aristocracy as the best forms of government, he also argues that 
the many have a just claim to power.  Aristotle believes that the collective wisdom of the 
majority can be more accurate than that of the individual.
  “For each individual among the many has a share of excellence and practical 
  wisdom, and when they meet together, just as they become in a manner one man, 
  who has many feet, and hands, and senses, so too with regard to their character 
  and thought. Hence the many are better judges than a single man” (Aristotle 1996, 
  1281b4-8) 
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Unlike Plato, he believes that the majority has the power to balance the desires of the community 
and diffuse the vices of both those of great wealth and destitute poverty.  In Book III of the 
Politics, Aristotle describes the equivalent to a Philosopher-King by saying,
  “If, however, there be some one person, or more than one, although not enough to 
  make up the full complement of a state, whose excellence is so pre-eminent that 
  the excellence or the political capacity of all the rest admit of no comparison with 
  his or their, he or they can be no longer regarded as part of a state; for justice will 
  not be done to the superior, if he is reckoned only as the equal of those who are so 
  far inferior to him in excellence and in political capacity.”  (Aristotle 1996, 
  1284a4-10)
Aristotle’s harmonious view of politics is one in which interaction and the involvement of 
multiple perspectives and experiences yields the greatest benefits to the greatest number of 
citizens.  Aristotle’s desire for harmony is related to the sense of connection created by the 
Dionysian element of tragedy.  One’s ability to be involved with others and to understand their 
perspectives is a pre-requisite for a political interaction in which each participant has a unique 
role that complements and supports the whole. 
 Nietzsche also holds a view of perspectivism that is a great deal like Aristotle and 
Arendt’s belief in the interaction of politics as a plurality.  For Nietzsche, true objectivity is to be 
found in the compilation of multiple perspectives.  Nietzsche’s description of objectivity 
develops in the Genealogy of Morals around a discussion of a new artistic kind of philosophy 
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opposed to “the dangerous old conceptual fiction that posited a ‘pure, will-less, painless, timeless 
knowing subject.” (Nietzsche 1989, 119)  We can be sure Nietzsche is referring here to the 
Socratic tradition.  Nietzsche goes on to say,
  “to see differently in this way for once, to want to see differently, is no small 
  discipline and preparation of the intellect for its future ‘objectivity’--the latter 
  understood not as ‘contemplation without interest; (which is a nonsensical 
  absurdity), but as the ability to control one’s Pro and Con and to dispose of them, 
  so that one knows how to employ a variety of perspectives and affect 
  interpretations in the service of knowledge.” (Nietzsche 1989, 119)
Yet it is not clear that this is the most desirable point of view.  Nietzsche adds, 
  “There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’; and the more 
  eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our 
  ‘concept’ of this thing, our ‘objectivity’ be.  But to eliminate the will altogether, 
  to suspend each and every affect, supposing we were capable of this--what would 
  that mean but to castrate the intellect?”  (Nietzsche 1989, 119)
Aristotle believes objectivity creates the most informed basis for political decision-making, and 
if objectivity is what we are seeking, Nietzsche agrees with the need for multiple perspectives.  
However, multiple perspectives also present the potential for losing our own insights in their 
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compilation with many other points of view.  The influence of too many perspectives could 
confuse our own view or cause us to doubt the source or process of coming to these views.  
Furthermore, Nietzsche is a champion for the artist, whose work requires perspective.  
Nietzsche’s writing calls attention to other shortfalls of Aristotle’s bid for objectivity.  The danger 
of losing one’s own point of view in a sea of perspectives is not only bad for the philosopher or 
the artist whose work depends on a commitment to their own perspective, but it might also be 
bad for deliberative politics.  To be capable of understanding and considering the views of others, 
one must be capable of understanding what resolute commitment to those views entails.  This 
understanding cannot be attained without a similar commitment to one’s own perspective.  Only 
when we are capable of fiercely defending our own views are we capable of appreciating such a 
defense by others.  Once we understand diverse experiences and the diverse perspectives they 
can produce, we are able to engage in fruitful deliberative politics. 
 The Republic’s resistance to the exploration of multiple experiences, both through 
political discourse and in the self-forgetting produced by the Dionysian element of tragedy, 
might align with Nietzsche’s warning that perspectivism can confuse us.  Socrates argues that 
some individuals, the philosophers, have a greater sense of reason and reservoir of knowledge.  
Exposure to multiple perspectives could cloud the knowledge the philosopher has attained 
through his own inquiry.  When there is any influx of information, especially one that consists of 
entirely new perspectives not simply different conclusions, the strength of one’s convictions is 
tested.  Exposure to multiple perspectives might cause us to question, even abandon conclusions 
drawn from our own point of view.  If we have come to these conclusions through a 
philosophical pursuit of truth, the danger that such reason would be overwhelmed by the 
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emotional draw of many other opinions is the kind of injustice that Socrates tries to prevent in 
the soul.  By contrast, Aristotle finds the potential of perspectivism to offer more benefits than 
harm, especially in the political realm where an understanding of the views of others is quite 
valuable.  The pity or empathy that is elicited by the experience of tragedy creates a sense of 
unity and connection between the events occurring on the stage and the audience.  If tragedy is 
indeed capable of offering a potential understanding of the experiences of others, it is a useful 
tool in the practice of political deliberation.  Being capable of understanding other points of view 
provides more thoughtful responses to the concerns of a community of diverse individuals, as 
well as appreciation for views, whether ultimately consistent with our own or not, that alternative 
experiences might lead one to form.
 Despite what he says about perspective and the performance of political interaction, 
Aristotle is conflicted about whether philosophy or politics is the best pursuit.  In Book VII of 
the Politics, he says, 
  “even those who agree in thinking that the life of excellence is the most desirable 
  raise a question, whether the life of business and politics is or is not more 
  desirable than one which is wholly independent of external goods, I mean than a 
  contemplative life, which by some is maintained to be the only one worthy of a 
  philosopher.” (Aristotle 1996, 1324a25-30)  
Aristotle shares the Platonic idea of absolute truth and struggles to decide what constitutes the 
best life.  Believing in an absolute truth means, for Plato and Aristotle, that ultimately there is 
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only one way to live and pursuing knowledge of this singular truth is the best way to spend one’s 
life.  Sharing this Platonic idea leads Aristotle to identify most vehemently the educational 
experience of tragedy, an argument that appeals to a preference for knowledge over spirit and 
desire.  While Aristotle discusses the value of multiple perspectives in political deliberation, the 
suggestion that the best life is one led outside of politics in pursuit of knowledge requires that 
there be a single perspective that we aspire towards and that is correct.  Aristotle tries to remedy 
the politics-philosophy divide by suggesting the best life is one lived in a city so as to maintain 
external goods and benefit from deliberative politics, but abstain from participating politically in 
favor of practicing philosophy.  In Book VIII, Aristotle says, “The whole of life is further divided 
into two parts, business and leisure, war and peace, and of actions some aim at what is necessary 
and useful, and some at what is honourable.”  The state is necessary and useful, and required for 
the execution of business and war, but those actions that are honorable, among them philosophy, 
require times of peace and the freedom from need to enjoy leisure.  “For men must be able to 
engage in business and to go to war, but leisure and peace are better; they must do what is 
necessary and indeed what is useful, but what is honourable is better.” (Aristotle 1333a30-33, 
1333a41-1333b2)  By the end of Book VII of the Politics, Aristotle’s Platonic belief in the 
superiority of truth leads him to favor philosophy over the political interaction he has explored 
and defended throughout the Politics and the Poetics.  
 Although Aristotle’s final analysis of what constitutes the best for the individual favors 
the practice of philosophy, he has consistently examined and advocated for the benefits of 
political plurality within the state.  Nietzsche’s description of objectivity is similar to the 
plurality Aristotle seeks.  Yet objectivity is rarely desirable for Nietzsche.  He insists that 
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perspective is necessary but in the defense of our views we must remain aware that they are not 
singularly correct and that others might be reasonably considered.  While Nietzsche’s 
understanding of perspectivism suggests outcomes similar to those of Aristotelian deliberative 
politics, Nietzsche wants us to passionately defend our own perspective while knowing that it 
does not come from a larger truth.  If we believe the perspectives or experiences of others can be 
equally valid to our own, we become free to pursue an individual existence enjoyable by virtue 
of its freedom from one correct path.  We also become more tolerant of what the experiences of 
others might have to offer.  Nietzsche’s concern for the individual leads him to argue for a 
lifestyle that is inadvertently best for successful and deliberative politics. 
5. Nietzsche’s Politics
 According to Nietzsche, the Dionysian element of tragedy allows us to forget ourselves 
and become lost in our connection to others.  The sense of unity that we feel in the Dionysian 
element lays the foundation for appreciating the views of others.  The moment of the Dionysian 
state is in itself frenzied, but when combined with the illusions of the Apollonian, the experience 
of tragic drama reinforces a sense of oneness with others.  Like the bonding that comes as a 
result of celebrating with teammates, or being rigorously trained with fellow musicians, the 
Dionysian element perpetuates a sense that “we are in this together.”  This feeling of community 
makes the deliberative element of political interaction easier to navigate.  Nietzsche would like 
us to be both committed to our own perspective, yet aware that it is not the only one.  The 
resulting commitment to ourselves and simultaneous tolerance of others is crucial to co-
existence, and hence to politics.  Nietzsche’s discussion of perspectivism explains the merits and 
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challenges identified by Plato and Aristotle, as well as offers the most politically sound approach 
to plurality.  Nietzsche’s idea of existence navigates the dialectic between the solitary, unitary life 
of the Philosopher-King, and Aristotle’s community-bound political animal.  By offering 
multiple perspectives as much consideration as we offer our own, Nietzsche suggests an 
existence that is faithful to personal preference yet capable of participating politically through 
understanding for the preferences of others. 
 Nietzsche does not spend much of his writing specifically exploring systems of 
government in the same way that Aristotle and Plato do, but he comes closest to a discussion of 
the function and value of government in Thus Spoke Zarathustra.  The section “Of the New Idol” 
describes the state as “the coldest of all cold monsters,” “invented for the 
superfluous.” (Nietzsche 1969, 75)  Nietzsche likens the state and the power it pretends to offer 
men to madness.  He encourages those who desire freedom to flee the concept of the state,
   “The earth still remains free for great souls. Many places--the odour of 
  tranquil seas blowing about them--are still empty for solitaries and solitary 
  couples.
   A free life still remains for great souls. Truly, he who possesses little is so 
  much the less possessed: praised be a moderate poverty!
   Only there, where the state ceases, does the man who is not superfluous 
  begin: does the song of the necessary man, the unique and irreplaceable melody, 
  begin.
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   There, where the state ceases--look there, my brothers. Do you not see it: 
  the rainbow and the bridges to the Superman?” (Nietzsche 1969, 78)
Nietzsche appears to share a Platonic rejection of politics; either covertly through the absence of 
deliberative politics in the ideal city or, if the Republic is to be read ironically, outrightly in his 
favor for an isolated life in search of truth.  Nietzsche’s adversity to the state rests in its 
perceived oppression, rather than a desire for the pursuit of something else, as we find in the 
Republic.  A free life, which the state censures, allows for greatness.  While Nietzsche does not 
share Plato and Aristotle’s belief in the existence of absolute truth, he too sees the state as largely  
standing in the way of man’s ability to fulfill his telos.  It is worth emphasizing that Plato and 
Aristotle are not discussing a state like the one Nietzsche is rejecting.  The deliberative political 
environment of ancient Greece is not equivalent to the bureaucratic state governments of the 
contemporary world.  Still, Nietzsche makes no outright appeal for political interaction, even at a 
very basic level.  His concern is constantly with the life of the individual, yet his conclusions 
regarding the best life for the individual produce a lifestyle and relationship to the world that is 
best for successful political interaction. 
 While Nietzsche and Plato both ultimately reject political participation, Nietzsche most 
skillfully navigates the Plato-Aristotle dialectic regarding politics.  Plato’s pursuit of unity, likely 
attributable to the true aim of the Republic (to identify the purpose of the individual life), leads 
him to dismiss facets of deliberative political interaction for which Aristotle advocates.  Aristotle 
is ultimately conflicted about whether the freedom from political duty, which creates space for 
philosophy, is the best life.  While Aristotle wavers on this point, it remains clear that he believes 
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political participation is an important part of being human.  Tragedy, Aristotle believes, facilitates 
this political participation by creating a respect for perspective and promoting the connection of 
individuals through their shared struggles.  By contrast, Plato’s writing, which reveals questions 
about the meaning of life and the power of Dionysian musical experience, largely rejects any role 
the elements of tragedy might play in our inevitable existence with one another.  While Aristotle 
is able to employ tragedy as a tool for broadening the experiential horizons of the participants in 
the deliberative political process he favors, Plato’s primary concern for the individual’s life as a 
philosopher makes no room for events that promote political interaction.  The educational stock 
Aristotle puts in the observation of tragic heroes, however, is largely tragedy’s ability to convey 
the superiority of moderation, rather than give us a kind of courage to live our lives in spite of 
our human flaws.  Nietzsche is the only author of the three to credit tragedy’s ability to give life 
meaning in this way.  This facet of tragedy allows us to co-exist with others through greater 
tolerance of each other and understanding of ourselves, flaws included.  This facilitates the most 
basic form of political participation.  Our ability to maintain successful and productive 
interactions with other members of society is a requisite for building a government that can 
provide the best lives for its citizens.  The life Nietzsche seeks is one that values and defends the 
individual perspective, while appreciating the perspectives of others.  His description of the 
Apollonian element of tragedy requires and allows us to become lost in an event we still know to 
be an illusion.  Through illusion, passion, and understanding, Nietzsche argues we will become 
capable of evading nihilism.  Nietzsche’s concern for our ability to live an individually fulfilling 
life that is free from the fallacy of absolute truth and the self-deprivation required to pursue it, 
leads him to advocate a life that is best suited to political interaction.  The existence Nietzsche 
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proposes has perspective, but understands objectivity, seeks a purpose, but understands its 
limitations, and appreciates art for the illusions it offers, which make life livable.  It is the 
Nietzschean man who is necessary for Aristotle’s deliberative politics, and can be so without 
rejecting the Platonic desire for an individually meaningful life.
 Of the three authors discussed here, Nietzsche’s writing occupies itself least with the 
issue of politics.  Yet the topics of his work, which offer discussions of the elements of existence 
such as perspective, lifestyle, and inspiration, explain the positions taken by Plato and Aristotle 
and inadvertently suggest a life most conducive to politics.  While Plato and Aristotle disagree 
about the constitution of political interaction, both possess a conflicted nature over the purpose 
of existence.  Both are uncertain about what can be made of the power music holds over the soul. 
Both believe in the correlation between men’s ability to attain fulfillment and the structure of 
government.  Aristotle may be the most political author of the three in his discussion of politics 
as a necessarily human occupation, but Nietzsche’s carefully developed ideas about the self, its 
relationship to others, and the ways we are impacted by the power of creativity, such as art and 
music, comprise a lifestyle that is most conducive to deliberative systems of government.  
Nietzsche would almost certainly reject such an assessment of his work, but the view of tragedy 
and music he holds, which articulate the ways in which they provide perspective, motivate 
ascetic ideals, and create illusions about life that help us avoid nihilism and co-exist with one 
another.  His writing offers tools for thinking about how to construct a society that appropriately 
utilizes and understands each of these things, and explains the elements of music and perspective 
that Plato and Aristotle identify as politically useful in their discussions of government.  The 
application of Nietzsche’s idea of an adequate existence to Aristotle’s appeal for political 
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participation provides an alternative image of existence to those of tyranny and philosophy, one 
that allows us to exist with one another.  As a result, the experience offered by music, which 
Nietzsche values through its role in tragedy, is an important one to our political relationships.  
Furthermore, thinking about our personal relationship to the world as Nietzsche explores it is a 
crucial consideration for how we operate communities.  
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